The daily report highlights the violations behind Israeli home demolitions and demolition threats in the occupied Palestinian territory, the confiscation and razing of lands, the uprooting and destruction of fruit trees, the expansion of settlements and erection of outposts, the brutality of the Israeli Occupation Army, the Israeli settlers' violence against Palestinian civilians and properties, the erection of checkpoints, the construction of the Israeli segregation wall and the issuance of military orders for the various Israeli purposes.

Brutality of the Israeli Occupation Army

- The Israeli occupying Army (IOA) raided several neighborhoods in Hebron and the towns of al-Dhahiriya, Yatta and Idhna, and erected military checkpoints at the entrances of Sa’ir and Halhul towns, and at the northern entrance of Hebron city where they stopped Palestinian vehicles and searched Palestinians’ ID cards. (WAFA 20 November 2017)

Israeli Arrests
• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) detained two young Palestinian men from Ya’bad town, south of Jenin, in the northern part of the occupied West Bank. The IOA installed a sudden military roadblock at the eastern entrance of the town, before stopping and searching dozens of cars, and interrogated many Palestinians while inspecting their ID cards. The soldiers then detained two young men, identified as Yahia Wasfi Hamarsha, 24, and Nimir Zeid al-Kilani, 24, and took them to a nearby military base. (IMEMC 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) installed a roadblock at the northern entrance of Azzoun village, east of the northern West Bank city of Qalqilia, before stopping and searching dozens of cars, in addition to obstructing traffic for several hours. Prior to installing the roadblock, several army jeeps invaded the town, and drove through its neighborhoods. (IMEMC 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli occupation Army (IOA) detained Naseem Atef Ahmad Shalalda, 21, and Sa’id ‘Atef Jaradat from the town of Sa’ir, northeast of Hebron. (WAFA 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli occupying Army (IOA) detained Mohammed Sabri Masalama, Ja’far Walid Masalma and 'Arakan Rizq Masalama, from Beit’ Awwa village, southwest of Hebron. (WAFA 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli occupation Army (IOA) stormed Ni’lin village, west of Ramallah, raided and searched a number of Palestinian houses and arrested activist ‘Abdullah Abu Rahma, and Muhammad' Adeeb Abu Rahma and Ahmad Muhammad Abu Rahma. (WAFA 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) detained Faraj Mohammed Sami Khuraisha (21 years old) and Ahmad Muhammad Nabhan Beida (20 years) in Jayyus village, northeast of Qalqilya, after raiding their family houses. (WAFA 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) invaded al-‘Isawiya town, in the center of Jerusalem, searched homes and detained two children, identified as Nader Mazen Moheisin and Zaki Sultan Obeid. (IMEMC 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) detained a child from his home in Shu’fat refugee camp, in Jerusalem, and took him to an interrogation facility. (IMEMC 20 November 2017)
• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) detained two young men near the military roadblock close to the main entrance of Shu’fat refugee camp. (IMEMC 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) invaded Hizma town, northeast of Jerusalem, and searched many homes while interrogating the families. (IMEMC 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) invaded the al-Matar neighborhood, near Qalandia terminal north of Jerusalem. The invasion terrified many families who feared that the soldiers were coming to demolish a local mosque and six residential towers, containing more than 140 apartments, as Israel has recently decided to demolish them due to “their proximity” to the Annexation Wall. (IMEMC 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) military jeeps invaded the center of Ramallah city, in central West Bank, before soldiers stormed many homes and stores, and abducted one Palestinian, identified as Nader Saba. The soldiers also invaded a jewelry store, owned by members of al-Asbah family, and violently searched it, before illegally confiscating its belongings. (IMEMC 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) invaded many neighborhoods in Hebron city, in addition to nearby towns of ath-Thaheriyya, Yatta and Ethna, and installed roadblocks on the main roads leading to Sa’ir and Halhoul towns, in addition to Hebron’s northern entrance, before stopping and searching dozens of cars, and interrogated many Palestinians while inspecting their ID cards. (IMEMC 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) invaded homes in Jayyous village, northeast of the northern West Bank city of Qalqilia, and detained two young men, identified as Faraj Sami Kkreisha, 21, and Ahmad Nabhan Baida, 20. (IMEMC 20 November 2017)

• The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) invaded Jenin city, and al-Yamoun town, west of Jenin, in northern West Bank, and installed a roadblock on the Jenin-Jaffa road, in an area leading to many nearby villages and
towns, before stopping and searching dozens of cars, and inspected the ID cards of dozens of Palestinians while interrogating them. (IMEMC 20 November 2017)

- The Israeli Occupation Army (IOA) summoned three Palestinians in Al Madares neighborhood and Safa area in Beit Ummer town north of Hebron city, to interview the Israeli intelligence Police in Etzion Detention center. The three summoned Palestinians were identified as Mazen Hussein Mahmoud At Tit, 26, Ali Sami Hasan Adi, 21, and Hamza Ibrahim Shihda Adi, 27. (WAFA 20 November 2017)

- The Israeli occupation army (IOA) detained a school student, identified as Yusuf Ali, at the locally known Israeli military checkpoint "Checkpoint No. 160" in the heart of Hebron city, near the Ibrahimi Mosque and took him to a nearby police station. (RB2000 20 November 2017)

Home Demolition & Demolition threats

- Israeli Occupation authorities (IOA) notified Palestinians of a decision to demolition residential and agricultural structures in the south Hebron Hills, or Masafer Yatta area, of the southern occupied West Bank district of Hebron. The IOA handed a written demolition notice to locals in the area against a number of residential structures and a livestock barns in the village of Khirbet Shaab al-Butum. The barns were built with funding from the European Union. Khirbet Shaab al-Butum is among dozens of small communities located in the Masafer Yatta area which falls within Israel's "Firing Zone 918," and inside the occupied West Bank's Area C, the 62 percent of the West Bank under full Israeli civil and security control. (Maannews 20 November 2017)

Expansion of settlements

- They accounted for just 4.5% of Israel’s population in 2016, but West Bank settlers got outsize government aid for construction, education and budgetary help for their local authorities, a study by the Center for Political Economics released on Sunday found. The settlements were the recipients of 10.2% of all residential construction initiated by the government, an increase of more than seven-fold since 2012 when they accounted for just 1.4%, although the rate was down from a historic high of 23.7% in 1998, according to the study, which sought to measure the economic costs of the settlements. Construction in the West Bank between 1995 and 2016 amounted to 0.6 square meters per capita
annually, compared with just 0.17 square meters for all of Israel and the territories combined. All told 36% of all building in the settlements was publicly initiated, meaning it was built on state-owned land with at least some government financing, versus 28.5% in Israel’s Southern District and 23.7% in the Jerusalem District, the study said. “Our report draws a picture showing that investment in Judea and Samaria hasn’t changed significantly and the gap [between the settlements and the rest of Israel] has even grown. That has to set off a red light for those who are seeking an equitable division of resources between all parts of the country,” said Roby Nathanson, the center’s CEO. Building in the West Bank is overwhelmingly residential. By the report’s calculations, the housing stock in the settlement has grown 120% since 1998, far exceeding the pace of growth for non-residential construction. The stock of commercial and hotel construction grew 37%, industrial building by 23% and agricultural structures by 6.9%. “The business and employment activity of Judea and Samaria residents takes place inside the Green Line. Most of the population commutes,” said Nathanson. “The government has built infrastructure to connect them with the center of country. It may also be that the restrictions on [settlement] exports to Europe and labeling products have affected industrial investment in these areas.” West Bank settlements also received a disproportionate share of government financial support for their local authorities. Local authorities inside the Green Line on average got aid equal to about 30.2% of their annual budgets while West Bank settlements got an average 44.1%. That amounted to 340 shekels ($97) more per settler than for the average resident of Israel’s Negev region and 740 shekels more than for the average Galilee resident. Most of the extra money came in the form of special grants, the study noted. Using figures from the Finance Ministry, the center estimated that the average settler was getting double the rest of the country. Haredi settlements in the West Bank, however, got less aid per capita than those predominantly national-religious or secular. Regarding government aid for public transportation, West Bank settlement received 220 million shekels in 2016, 12.3% of all aid that was disbursed that year. Investment on sewage projects settlements got 10.3% of all aid, although the study noted that costs in the West Bank are higher because settlements are relatively small and dispersed. In education, settlement schools got an extra 536.9 million shekels last year than schools inside the Green Line after taking into account that characteristics of the two populations (schools in West Bank settlements are overwhelmingly ultra-Orthodox and religious, and get more assistance nationwide on that basis). On a per capita basis, the
extra spending worked out to 4,191 shekels per student last year, up from 3.684 in 2015. (Haaretz 20 November 2017)

Other

• Plans for a cable car to the Old City are being fast-tracked by the Jerusalem Development Authority, the Tourism Ministry and the Jerusalem municipality, over objections of its environmental and political implications. The cable car is expected to approach sensitive sites such as the Western Wall and the Temple Mount, provoking strong criticism from the Palestinians and the international community. Meetings with residents near the cable car’s planned stops have been held over the past few weeks and a public information center has been opened. The project is to be presented to the National Infrastructure Committee in three weeks. Despite increasing opposition to the plan, according to the Jerusalem Development Authority, barring complications, the cable car will be in operation in 2021. The Jerusalem Development Authority is presenting the 200-million shekel ($57 million) project as a means of solving the snarled traffic around the Old City. The first phase calls for three stops: near the old train station, at the Mount Zion parking lot and on the roof of the Kedem Center, the planned visitor center at the City of David. According to the plan, each car along the 1.4-kilometer line will be able to carry up to 10 passengers, and 73 cars will operate simultaneously for a total capacity of 3,000 passengers per hour at peak times. The system will be automatic – a car will leave every 15 to 20 minutes whether or not there are passengers. The cars will travel at 21 kilometers per hour, making the trip in less than five minutes. The cable car will require construction of 15 large concrete pylons, the tallest of which will be 26 meters high. In addition to the political problems foreseen due to major objections from the Palestinians and the international community, the cable car is expected to run afoul of landscape preservationists and activists concerned about its intrusion into the Old City skyline. They fear the cable car will turn into a tourist attraction, a Disneyland-like feature, rather than a means of public transport. However, the Jerusalem Development Authority says the cable car will hardly be visible; the cars will not run above the Old City walls but rather alongside them. The cable car will produce fewer emissions than the hundreds of buses it will replace, making it an ecological project, the authority said. (Haaretz 20 November 2017)

• Yotam Berger’s article in Haaretz (“A quixotic battle for settlers’ ‘right of return’ in West Bank,” Nov. 17) brought back memories of the disengagement of August 2005, where hundreds of Israeli families
were forcibly evicted from their homes. And the question still lingers in the air: why? What rationale or logic caused Ariel Sharon, the architect and patron of much of the Israeli settlements beyond the 1949 armistice lines, to reverse course and decide on the eviction of the settlers in the Gaza Strip and in northern Samaria? And why did many of the Likud leadership at the time decide to follow Sharon and abandon their party and lend their support to the disengagement? Gush Katif, the settlement bloc at the southern end of the Gaza Strip, was unlike Kfar Darom and Netzarim which were situated in the middle of the Gaza Strip. It constituted a relatively isolated settlement bloc. Three settlements – Dugit, Nisanit, and Elei Sinai – were another small settlement bloc located at the northern edge of the Gaza Strip. Whereas the evacuation of Kfar Darom and Netzarim might have been justified by security considerations, why were the settlers of Gush Katif and those at the northern edge of the Gaza Strip forced out of their homes? Obviously there must have been some other consideration that prompted Sharon’s decision. Some of those who were prepared to support the disengagement told Sharon that there was little reason to evacuate Dugit, Nisanit, and Elei Sinai, but he stuck to his guns and insisted that any and all Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, right up to the 1949 armistice lines concluded with Egypt, would be evacuated. He was evidently eager to signal Israeli readiness to withdraw from the entire area occupied by the Egyptian Army when it attacked Israel in 1948. Was that supposed to serve as a precedent for future Israeli withdrawals from areas beyond the 1949 armistice lines? It is difficult to find any other rationale for this move. But most puzzling of all was his decision to accompany the disengagement from the Gaza Strip by a removal of the Israeli settlements from northern Samaria – Kadim, Ganim, Homesh, and Sa-Nur. These settlements had no connection with the Gaza Strip; what could possibly be gained by this move? Was he indicating that this was only a beginning, and that all Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria, anything beyond the 1949 armistice lines, were destined to be forcibly evacuated? His successor, Ehud Olmert, made no bones about his intention to proceed in that direction. Since then, the term “settlement blocs” has entered the lexicon of the Israeli political discourse. Presumably all Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria were destined for evacuation except for the settlement blocs. But actually the only settlement blocs that had been established beyond the 1949 armistice lines had been the Gush Katif settlements and the settlements at the northern edge of the Gaza Strip and they had already been destroyed. Whereas a number of large Israeli settlements have been established in Judea and Samaria, notably Maale Adumim, and Ariel, they are not isolated settlement blocs and are surrounded by
many Palestinian villages. Gush Etzion, the Etzion bloc, was a settlement bloc in pre-State days, but is now surrounded by heavily populated Palestinian areas. The desire to assure that large settlements be included within the borders of Israel in any future agreement with the Palestinians is understandable and justified, even if they do not constitute settlement blocs. Much of the public support that existed at the time for the disengagement from Gaza has in the meantime evaporated. Subsequent events – the Hamas takeover of Gaza, the periodic rocketing of Israeli towns and villages from there – have exposed the senselessness of that move. Nevertheless, it is now an established fact. Northern Samaria, unlike Gaza, is under IDF control. The reestablishment of all or part of the settlements in northern Samaria that were destroyed at the time needs to be examined. (Haaretz 20 November 2017)